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A Case for Private Language 
Peter Asaro 
A. J. Ayer, in his paper /lCan There Be a Private Language?/I, argues 
that there are really two different ways for a language to be private. 
The first is a language in which the objects of the terms in the language 
are only subjectively accessible, a language of private sensation. This is 
the sense of private language he feels most philosophers have taken in 
the debate over the possibility of private language. The way Ayer 
wishes to interpret private language is as a language which is developed 
and used by a single speaker, where the terms can refer to objects which 
are externally observable as well as to objects which are only 
subjectively accessible. To distinguish this sense of a private language, I 
shall call it a solitary language and oppose it to a language with more 
than one speaker, a social language. Ayer argues that a solitary language 
is logically possible and extrapolates from this that a language of private 
sensation might also be logically possible. 
Ayer's defense of private and solitary language depends on his 
diffusing an argument from Wittgenstein on the impossibility of 
language of private sensation. Ayer relies on his arguments for the 
possibility of solitary language to do this. I think that Ayer has taken 
Wittgenstein's argument too strictly and that by extending the 
implications of Wittgenstein's argument it can be shown that a solitary 
language is epistemically impossible, at least in the fashion that is 
required by Ayer. I will show that while it might be logically or 
metaphysically possible for a solitary individual to devise a language, it 
is epistemically impossible for a solitary speaker to fix the terms of 
language to the degree required for it to qualify as a language for that 
speaker. 
Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language 
is generally taken to be an argument against a language of private 
sensation. This interpretation takes it that a language of private 
sensation will be epistemically impossible because the references of the 
terms are not externally observable. I think that what his argument 
really amounts to is showing the epistemic impossibility of any solitary 
language, regardless of the observability of the referents. I think that 
Wittgenstein discusses private sensations because this is a clear example 
of a case of allegedly private meaning, where the referents are 
solipsistic. But Ayer points out that an individual such as Robinson 
Crusoe, if he were to shipwreck before having acquired a language, 
would be in a position to develop a language capable of describing 
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~publicly observable objects without a public. Thus, Robinson Crusoe 
would speak a solitary language which would only have meaning for 
him. According to Ayer, Crusoe's language could become a social 
language; it just happens to be solitary because there is no one else 
around to speak it. If we take Ayer at his word, then for a solitary 
language to exist it must meet the criteria for a social language, yet be 
created and used by only one individual. For the purposes of this paper, 
I take a language to be a set of terms or symbols and rules which are 
attached to meanings and referents in a way that allows a speaker to 
express his/her beliefs about his/her world of experience. The 
epistemic criteria for such a language is that a speaker must be able to 
use the terms and rules correctly and be able to verify that s/he has 
done so. 
In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein argues that a private 
language is impossible because an individual cannot verify the 
correctness of his own use of a tenn or sign. Since correctness becomes 
arbitrary, so does meaning. Wittgenstein's example goes like this: 
I want keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain 
sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign'S' and 
write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I 
have the sensation. I will remark first of all that a 
definition of the sign cannot be fonnulated.-But still I 
can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.-How? 
Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. 
But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same 
time I concentrate my attention on the sensation-and 
so, as it were, point to it inwardly.-But what is this 
ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition 
surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.-Well, 
that is done precisely by the concentration of my 
attention; for in this way I impress on myself the 
connection between the sign and the sensation.-But '1 
impress it on myself' can only mean: this process 
brings it about that I remember the connexion right in 
the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of 
correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to 
seem right to me is right. And that only means one 
can't talk about 'right' ...Let us imagine a table 
(something like a dictionary) that exists only in our 
imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify the 
translation of a word X into a word Y. But are we also 
to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up 
only in the imagination?-'Well, yes: then it is a 
subjective justification'.-But justification consists in 
appealing to something independen 
appeal from one memory to anothe 
don't know if I have remembered th 
of a train right and to check it I call b 
of the time-table looked. Isn't it the 
this process has got to produce a me 
actually correct. If the mental image 
could not itself be tested for correctn 
confinn the correctness of the first m 
someone were to buy several copies 
paper to assure himself that what it! 
Looking up a table in the imaginatio 
looking up a table than the image of 
experiment is the result of and exper 
Ayer,450-451) 
Wittgenstein concludes from his argument 
language of private sensation but it will be ir 
language. Thus, a private sensation will be il 
description. 
This argument rests upon the fact that if th 
cannot be checked or verified to be correct, t1 
indetenninate. A language with indetermim 
qualify as a language. In public languages tt 
determining the correctness of a speaker's us 
being corrected by other speaker according t. 
language. Wittgenstein's point is not that WE 
or talk about private sensations. His point is 
'kept to oneself' as it were, there is no way fc 
arise which could stabilize the language and 
In giving his account of Robinson Crusoe r 
language on his own, Ayer takes it that Crus. 
logically possible though likely not psychol() 
us to imagine someone, such as Robinson Cr 
on an island, and to further imagine that the 
early, prelinguistic age and the Crusoe baby 
that Crusoe has not yet acquired a language 
with any language. Ayer maintains that Cm 
own language which could refer to various E 
on his island, and in a similar manner this la 
with refer to Crusoe's private sensations. I tI 
Wittgenstein's argument to Robinson Crusoe 
will not be able to determine the terms of his; 
adequately, and will therefore not be able to 
• 
2
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol7/iss1/4
N'ithout a public. Thus, Robinson Crusoe 
Jage which would only have meaning for 
usoe's language could become a social 
be solitary because there is no one else 
te Ayer at his word, then for a solitary 
et the criteria for a social language, yet be 
Ie individual. For the purposes of this paper, 
of terms or symbols and rules which are 
ferents in a way that allows a speaker to 
t his/her world of experience. The 
language is that a speaker must be able to 
ectly and be able to verify that s/he has 
~ations Wittgenstein argues that a private 
use an individual cannot verify the 
f a term or sign. Since correctness becomes 
Wittgenstein's example goes like this: 
y about the recurrence of a certain 
nd I associate it with the sign '5' and 
:alendar for every day on which I 
I will remark first of all that a 
n cannot be formulated.-But still I 
nd of ostensive definition.-How? 
~sation? Not in the ordinary sense. 
~ the sign down, and at the same 
'y attention on the sensation-and 
to it inwardly.-But what is this 
hat is all it seems to be! A definition 
lblish the meaning of a sign.-Well, 
Iy by the concentration of my 
,way I impress on myself the 
l the sign and the sensation.-But '1 
f' can only mean: this process 
I remember the connexion right in 
\e present case I have no criterion of 
ould like to say: whatever is going to 
right. And that only means one 
ht'...Let us imagine a table 
ictionary) that exists only in our 
tionary can be used to justify the 
lrd X into a word Y. But are we also 
on if such a table is to be looked up 
tion?-'Well, yes: then it is a 
ion'.-But justification consists in 
appealing to something independent.-'But surely I can 
appeal from one memory to another. For example, I 
don't know if I have remembered the time of departure 
of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page 
of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here?' No; for 
this process has got to produce a memory which is 
actually correct. If the mental image of the time-table 
could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it 
confirm the correctness of the first memory? (As if 
someone were to buy several copies of the morning 
paper to assure himself that what it said was true.) 
Looking up a table in the imagination is no more 
looking up a table than the image of an imagined 
experiment is the result of and experiment. (Trans. 
Ayer,450-451) 
Wittgenstein concludes from his argument that we can have a 
language of private sensation but it will be in the terms of public 
language. Thus, a private sensation will be identified by a public 
description. 
This argument rests upon the fact that if the use of a term or sign 
cannot be checked or verified to be correct, then the term's use is 
indeterminate. A language with indeterminant terms simply doesn't 
qualify as a language. In public languages there is a clear way of 
de~ermining the correctness of a speaker's use of the language, namely, 
bemg corrected by other speaker according to the conventions of the 
language. Wittgenstein's point is not that we cannot make up terms for 
or talk about private sensations. His point is that so long as language is 
'kept to oneself' as it were, there is no way for linguistic connections to 
arise which could stabilize the language and save it from indeterminacy. 
In giving his account of Robinson Crusoe making up an entire 
language on his own, Ayer takes it that Crusoe's achievement would be 
logic~lly p?ssible though likely not psychologically possible. Ayer tells 
us to Imagme someone, such as Robinson Crusoe, who is stranded alone 
on an island, and to further imagine that the stranding occurred at an 
early, prelinguistic age and the Crusoe baby was raised by wolves so 
that Crusoe has not yet acquired a language nor does he come in contact 
with any language. Ayer maintains that Crusoe might well develop his 
own language which could refer to various externally observable objects 
on his island, and in a similar manner this language might contain terms 
with refer to Crusoe's private sensations. I think that if we extend 
Wittgenstein's argument to Robinson Crusoe, we will see that Robinson 
will not be able to determine the terms of his language for public objects 
adequately, and will therefore not be able to use his own solitary 
3
Asaro '94: A Case for Private Language
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1994
language correctly. 
Certainly for any purely "mental language", one whose terms are 
unspoken and unwritten and exist solely in his head, which Crusoe 
comes up with, he will be in the very same situation as the diary-of­
sensations keeper. His use of a term at any time will rely on his 
memories about what the term meant before and whether it applies 
now. This leaves Crusoe's terms meaning whatever he wants them to 
mean; he can never make a linguistic "mistake" and so his use of a term 
will be indeterminant. But as the referents of his language are public, so 
might the terms become public by being written down, presenting us 
with a more interesting challenge to claim that and individual could not 
use a solitary language with certainty. 
So let us imagine that Cursoe is able to assign symbols to objects on 
his island. In this way his ascriptions will be public and, according to 
Ayer, should be satisfactorily checkable. Crusoe's doing this amounts to 
making a public dictionary for his language. This would make his 
language public, but as long as he is able on the island the language will 
be solitary. The question now is whether Crusoe will be able to 
determine the terms of this language by this dictionary. 
I believe that such a public dictionary will not be able to fix his terms, 
as the following example will demonstrate. Imagine that on a particular 
day Crusoe eats the fruit of a tree on his island and leaves a mark on that 
tree to indicate whether the fruit was edible or poisonous. Some time 
later, Crusoe returns to the tree and sees the marking. He takes the 
marking to mean that the fruit is edible, but upon eating the fruit 
becomes quite ill. Crusoe has make a mistake, but the fundamental 
problem is deciding what kind of mistake he has make. if his sign did 
mean that the tree bore edible fruit, then he made a linguistic mistake 
when he marked the tree incorrectly. If his sign meant that the tree bore 
poisonous fruit, then his linguistic mistake was in misinterpreting his 
marking. How is Crusoe to decide which mistake he made? He will 
have to depend on his memories about the meaning he wished to mark 
to have when he made it. While he might be inclined to decide one way 
or the other, he has nothing but his memory to verify the correctness of 
his decision; he cannot ask anyone what the marking mean. Depending 
on his decision, the marking can either mean "poisonous" or "edible" 
and since he cannot verify which it means, the marking is left meaning 
whatever he wants it to mean now. He is again no better off than our 
diary-of-sensations keeper. 
The only way to verify the proper use and meaning of a term is to 
have an objective standard for its correct use. Public dictionaries will 
not help Crusoe's problem is not that the referents or symbols of his 
language are private it is that the meanings of his symbols are private. 
And so long as there are no other speakers of his language, there is no 
way of making his meanings public. And i 
then they are dependent on his memory ale 
indeterminant. only another speaker can d 
match his meanings correctly. 
The only way to determine the meanings 
establish to connection between tokens and 
connection must be established through co: 
require multiple speakers to be objective st 
solipsistic they will be indeterminant. The 
determinant when they are maintained by 1 
when a mistake is made, it is corrected by ~ 
linguistic community according to the com 
for communicating meaning. If an individt 
conventional use of a term s/he will fail to 
speakers. The mistaken speaker will be cor 
meaning across. By establishing and maint 
members of a linguistic community can ins' 
language. Thus, public linguistic communi 
of their language. Thus, public linguistic cc 
which the semantics of a language are stabi 
A possible objection to this line of argumt 
would be that it is too strong for any langui 
the case. In a social language, the connectic 
meanings will be established by convention 
David Lewis' account to how a language is 
A language L is used by a popula 
there prevails in P a convention of t 
in L, sustained by and interest in co 
(Lewis,293). 
When a linguistic mistake is made, the pa 
other members of the linguistic community. 
and are stabilized. Granted, it is possible fo 
community to make a "mistake", but for thE 
This is reflected in the etymological evolutk 
meant foolish, and now it means pleasant -il 
What happens is that the convention maint<: 
down or changes. The word's meaning cha: 
changes. Quite simply, a word means what 
used in communication. Even though the cc 
change, there is a still a method for discover 
have made a mistake when you fail to comn 
other speakers. But with other speakers YOt 
thought clarifications. There is not way to c 
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"mental language", one whose terms are 
ld exist solely in his head, which Crusoe 
n the very same situation as the diary-of­
of a term at any time will rely on his 
~rm meant before and whether it applies 
terms meaning whatever he wants them to 
linguistic "mistake" and so his use of a ~erm 
as the referents of his language are publIc, so 
tblic by being written down, presenting us 
allenge to claim that and individual could not 
h certainty. 
rsoe is able to assign symbols to objects on 
lSCriptiOns will be public and, according to 
ily checkable. Crusoe's doing this am~unts to 
,for his language. This would make hiS 
g as he is able on the island the language will 
ow is whether Crusoe will be able to 
,language by this dictionary. 
lie dictionary will not be able to fix his terms, 
dll demonstrate. Imagine that on a particular 
fa tree on his island and leaves a mark on that 
~ fruit was edible or poisonous. Some time 
,tree and sees the marking. He takes the 
ruit is edible, but upon eating the fruit 
ilas make a mistake, but the fundamental 
kind of mistake he has make. if his sign did 
lble fruit, then he made a linguistic mistake 
ncorrectly. If his sign meant that the tree bore 
nguistic mistake was in misinterpreting ~is 
o decide which mistake he made? He Will 
nories about the meaning he wished to mark 
While he might be inclined to decide one way 
g but his memory to verify the correctness ?f 
( anyone what the marking mean. Dependmg 
\g can either mean "poisonous" or "edible" 
which it means, the marking is left meaning 
~an now. He is again no better off than our 
he proper use and meaning of a term is to 
I for its correct use. Public dictionaries will 
l is not that the referents or symbols of his 
hat the meanings of his symbols are private. 
o other speakers of his language, there is no 
way of making his meanings public. And is his meanings are private, 
then they are dependent on his memory alone and therefore 
indeterminant. only another speaker can determine if Crusoe's symbols 
match his meanings correctly. 
The only way to determine the meanings of linguistic tokens is to 
establish to connection between tokens and meanings publicly. This 
connection must be established through convention. Conventions 
require multiple speakers to be objective standards; if conventions are 
solipsistic they will be indeterminant. The terms of language are 
determinant when they are maintained by public conventions because 
when a mistake is made, it is corrected by other members of the 
linguistic community according to the conventions. Language is a tool 
for communicating meaning. If an individual speaker violates the 
conventional use of a term s/he will fail to communicate with other 
speakers. The mistaken speaker will be corrected in order to get his/her 
meaning across. By establishing and maintaining conventions, the 
members of a linguistic community can insure the proper use of their 
language. Thus, public linguistic community can insure the proper use 
of their language. Thus, public linguistic convention is the means by 
which the semantics of a language are stabilized and determined. 
A possible objection to this line of argument against solitary languages 
would be that it is too strong for any language to exist. but this is not 
the case. In a social language, the connection between tokens and 
meanings will be established by convention. This is pointed out in 
David Lewis' account to how a language is implemented: 
A language L is used by a population P is and only if 
there prevails in P a convention of truthfulness and trust 
in L, sustained by and interest in communication. 
(Lewis,293). 
When a linguistic mistake is made, the party in error is corrected by 
other members of the linguistic community. This is how semantics arise 
and are stabilized. Granted, it is possible for the entire linguistic 
community to make a "mistake", but for the language to still succeed. 
This is reflected in the etymological evolution of words. "Nice" once 
meant foolish, and now it means pleasant -its meaning has changed. 
What happens is that the convention maintaining the word's use breaks 
down or changes. The word's meaning changes as its conventions 
changes. Quite simply, a word means what it does because of how it is 
used in communication. Even though the convention use of a term can 
change, there is a still a method for discovering linguistic mistakes. You 
have made a mistake when you fail to communicate your meaning with 
other speakers. But with other speakers you can correct the mistake 
thought clarifications. There is not way to clarity mistakes 
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solipsistically. 
The linguistic checkability of language is reflected in how language is 
psychologically acquired. We learn language by trial and error. We are 
corrected when we make mistakes until we make no or few mistakes. 
We need an external speaker of the language in order to do this; only an 
intelligent speaker of a language can comprehend the meanings of the 
terms of the language. A dictionary can never access the linguistic 
meanings of the terms which it contains in the way that a speaker can. 
A solitary language could be devised, but it could never be justifiably 
knowable. This should seem to imply that the only way to learn a 
language is from a source which has already mastered the language, and 
hence that a natural language such as English could have never 
developed unless it had always been spoken. But this is not the case. So 
long as there is a desire to communicate, two or more individuals can 
give rise to language through trial and error because of the success or 
failure of their communication with each other. In general, words came 
to mean what they did not by the decision of single person but by their 
successes in communicating. Hence, any two or more speakers could 
establish public conventions and therefore a social language from 
scratch. 
All that remains is to clarify some cases which Ayer takes to be 
examples of solitary languages. The first is the case of an individual 
who is the last speaker of a once social language. Quite obviously, this 
individual is the only person who speaks the language, but the language 
arose socially and hence is really a social language. Such and 
individual, in mastering the social language, has adequately learned the 
conventions of that language and so the language is adequately 
determined. 
The second example Ayer gives is of someone developing a secret 
code for a diary or such, which she alone uses. This is the case of a 
solitary natural language. The real meaning of the terms in such a code 
depends on the meanings of the decoded terms in the natural language. 
The code is of symbolic manipulation on terms of the natural language 
and does not add to or change any of the meanings from what could be 
written in the natural uncoded language. Formal languages contain 
only syntax; they have no semantics. There would be no difficulty in 
developing a solitary formal language, because it does not try to connect 
the tokens to any meanings. The rules for the manipulations of the 
formal language could be written in the natural language, a decoder as it 
were, and thus remain determinant. The only way for a formal 
language to have any meaning is for it to be a syntactic manipulation of 
a natural language which has meaning. In this way, a formal language 
could not develop without a natural language which is in tum 
dependent on social convention. 
Ayer's final case is that of solitary terms c 
something to a single individual. This is re 
already existing and mastered social langue 
up a novel word and before we use it/ it is c 
describable in the existing terms of the lang 
when we coin a new them. When we first l 
definition or description in a sociallanguag 
dependent on the inventor's naturallangua 
does not constitute a language; it is simply 
I have shown how I think Wittgenstein/s 
languages. Solitary languages do not meet 
proper, at least in being epistemically verifi 
this criterion is not so strict as to preclude a 
there are cases of solitary linguistic practice 
constitute a genuine natural language. You 
wish, but you language is not your own. 
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r gives is of someone developing a secret 
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.ritten in the natural language, a decoder as it 
rrninant. The only way for a formal 
ling is for it to be a syntactic manipulation of 
as meaning. In this way, a formal language 
a natural language which is in tum 
ltion. 
Ayer's final case is that of solitary terms or jargon, which only mean 
something to a single individual. This is really a case of augmenting an 
already existing and mastered social language. We can certainly make 
up a novel word and before we use it, it is quite private. But it will be 
describable in the existing terms of the language. This is what happens 
when we coin a new them. When we first use it, it is given an ostensive 
definition or description in a social language. Plus, this novel term is 
dependent on the inventor's natural language for its syntax and use. It 
does not constitute a language; it is simply an addition to a language. 
I have shown how I think Wittgenstein's argument extends to solitary 
languages. Solitary languages do not meet the criterion of a language 
proper, at least in being epistemically verifiable. I have also shown how 
this criterion is not so strict as to preclude any language at all. While 
there are cases of solitary linguistic practice, these practices do not 
constitute a genuine natural language. You can talk to yourself all you 
wish, but you language is not your own. 
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